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ABSURDITY AND THE LIMITS OF
LITERALISM: DEFINING THE ABSURD
RESULT PRINCIPLE IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION*
VERONICA M. DOUGHERTY**
[I] t is a venerable principle that a law will not be interpreted to
produce absurd results. "The common sense of man approves the
judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which
enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished
with the utmost severity,' did not extend to the surgeon who
opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.
The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that
the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who
breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a
prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire-'for he is not
to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt."
'
"
[T]he absurdity clause has a relative and variable content which
threatens the entire foundation of literal theory.'
INTRODUCTION
The absurd result principle in statutory interpretation provides an
exception to the rule that a statute should be interpreted according
* © 1994 Veronica M. Dougherty.
** Assistant Director, Law and Public Policy Program, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. J.D. 1987, Harvard Law School; M.P.P. 1987, Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University; B.A. 1977, Bethany College.
I wish to thank Paula Dubberly, David F. Forte, and Timothy M. Hurley for helpful comments
on prior drafts, and Edward K. Bilich for the conversation that originally piqued my interest in
this topic.
1. KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,325 (1988) (Scalia,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868)).
2. E. Russell Hopkins, The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule, 15 CAN. B. REv. 689, 695
(1937).
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to its plain meaning. In an age of increasing debate about the proper
approach to statutory interpretation, and of increasing emphasis on
literal approaches, the absurd result principle poses intriguing
challenges to literalism and to theories of interpretation generally.
The absurd result principle is extraordinarily powerful. It authoriz-
es a judge to ignore a statute's plain words in order to avoid the
outcome those words would require in a particular situation. This is
a radical thing; judges are not supposed to rewrite laws. Ordinarily,
such actions would be condemned as a usurpation of the legislative
role, an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers.' Even
when a genuine question exists about the actual meaning of the
statute's words, it is generally considered to be illegitimate for ajudge
to make the choice between possible meanings on the basis that the
real-life result of one meaning strikes the judge as somehow objection-
able.4 The absurd result principle apparently gives just that power
and authority to a judge.' Yet this principle enjoys almost universal
endorsement, even by those who are the most critical of judicial
discretion and most insistent that the words of the statute are the only
legitimate basis of interpretation.6
This unique power of the absurd result principle stands in striking
contrast both to the general lack of understanding of the principle
and the dearth of attention it receives in the literature and in the
courts. Cases using or referring to the principle do not define
absurdity, nor do they specify the kinds of situations where the
principle should be applied. In addition, despite the recent increase
in judicial and scholarly attention to issues involving topics of statutory
interpretation, the principle, its theoretical foundations, and its
3. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
5. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting that absurd result principle allows judiciary to avoid applying statute's
plain meaning).
6. See, e.g., id. (noting that absurd result principle is legitimate exception to plain meaning
rule); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting literal interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) (1) because it would produce
absurd result); Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860,862 (7th Cir. 1994) (EasterbrookJ.) (stating
that statutes are to be taken seriously, and their language bent "only when the text produces
absurd results"); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960
F.2d 1339, 1345 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (remarking that "even interpretative literalists"
recognize that if result of strict interpretation is absurd, "interpreter is free (we would say
compelled) to depart in the direction of sense"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992).
7. E.g., Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 113 S. Ct.
716,720 (1993); Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470-75 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (endorsing principle,
but not defining absurdity); Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating
principle, and saying it applies in this case, but not defining it); Kirby v. United States, 74 U.S.
482, 486-87 (1868) (stating principle but not defining it).
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implications remain virtually unnoticed and unexamined.' Yet, the
principle enjoys almost universal acceptance in the legal systems of
the United States ' and a number of other countries.1"
8. But see generally INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATiVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick
& Robert S. Summers eds., 1991) (discussing principle as one common to legal system of various
countries studied, and also its function in various legal systems); see also Margaret Gilhooley,
Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative Purpose: The Interpretation of the Delaney Clause, 40
ADMIN. L. Rv. 267, 279-80 (1988) (discussing significance of absurd result principle in context
of administrative interpretations of statutes). Several older articles also discuss the principle.
See, e.g.,J.A. Corry, AdministrativeLaw and the lnterpretation of Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO LJ. 286, 298-
312 (1936) (tracing development and application of golden rule of statutory interpretation that
created exception to literalism for absurd consequences); Hopkins, supra note 2 (expounding
on relationship between canon of literal interpretation and absurd result rule); FrederickJ. de
Sloovhre, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 591, 600-02 (1936) (explaining
absurd result principle in context of rule that statutes should be given reasonable interpreta-
tion).
9. State and federal courts refer to the absurd result principle with great frequency. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the principle as recently as last year. See
Rowland, 113 S. Ct. at 720 n.3 (calling absurd result principle "common mandate" and noting
that it "has been applied throughout the history of 1 U.S.C. § 1 and its predecessors"). In
addition, the highest courts of all 50 states and the District of Columbia have endorsed this
principle. See, e.g., State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 So. 2d 95, 101 (Ala. 1974); Nystrom
v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115, 1124 (Alaska 1989); City of Prescott v. Town of Chino
Valley, 803 P.2d 891, 895 (Ariz. 1990); Cox v. State, 853 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Ark. 1993); Roberts
v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 503 (Cal. 1993); Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v.
Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39,44 (Colo. 1992); Scrapchansky v. Town of Plainfield, 627 A.2d 1329, 1332
(Conn. 1993); Lewis v. State, 626 A.2d 1350, 1356 (Del. 1993); Bates v. District of Columbia Bd.
of Elections & Ethics, 625 A.2d 891, 896 (D.C. 1993) (Schwelb,J., concurring); Orange County
v. Gipson, 548 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1989); Sizemore v. State, 416 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1992);
Keaulii v. Simpson, 847 P.2d 663, 666 (Haw. 1993); Permit No. 36-7200 ex rel. Idaho Dep't of
Parks & Recreation v. Higginson, 828 P.2d 848, 851 (Idaho 1992); People v. Bole, 613 N.E.2d
740, 743 (Ill. 1993); Guinn v. Light, 558 N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ind. 1990); First Iowa State Bank v.
Iowa Dep't of Natural Resources, 502 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Iowa 1993); State v. Schlein, 854 P.2d
296, 303 (Kan. 1993); City of Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank & Trust Co., 843 S.W.2d 327, 329
(Ky. 1992); Rodriguez v. Louisiana Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 618 So. 2d 390,394 (La. 1993); Fraser
v. Barton, 628 A.2d 146, 148 (Me. 1993); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r of
Md., 612 A.2d 1301, 1304 (Md. 1992); Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 551 N.E.2d 906, 907 (Mass.
1990); Gardner v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 517 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1994); Park Towers Ltd.
Partnership v. County of Hennepin, 498 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Minn. 1993); McBrayer v. State, 467
So. 2d 647, 648 (Miss. 1985); Magee v. Blue Ridge Professional Bldg. Co., 821 S.W.2d 839, 844
(Mo. 1991); Doting v. Trunk, 856 P.2d 536, 541 (Mont. 1993); Professional Firefighters of
Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, 498 N.W.2d 325, 332 (Neb. 1993); Ashokan v. State, 856
P.2d 244, 248 (Nev. 1993); Raudonis v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 623 A.2d 746, 749 (N.H. 1993);
Essex County Div. of Welfare v. OJ., 608 A.2d 907, 913 (N.J. 1992); Ashbaugh v. Williams, 747
P.2d 244, 245 (N.M. 1988); People v. Bolden, 613 N.E.2d 145, 149 (N.Y. 1993); Burgess v. Your
House of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 134, 140 (N.C. 1990); Ames v. Rose Township Bd. of Township
Supervisors, 502 N.W.2d 845, 856 (N.D. 1993); Gates Mills Club Dev. Co. v. Cuyahoga County
Bd. of Revision, 594 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Ohio 1992); TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewinston, 829 P.2d
15, 20 (Okla. 1992); State ex rel. Kirsch v. Curnutt, 853 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Or. 1993); Common-
wealth v. Zdrale, 608 A.2d 1037, 1039 (Pa. 1992); State v. Lusi, 625 A.2d 1350, 1351 (RI. 1993);
Fort Hill Natural Gas Auth. v. City of Easley, 426 S.E.2d 787, 789 (S.C. 1993); In re Petition of
Famous Brands, 347 N.W.2d 882,886 (S.D. 1984); Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674,676 (Tenn.
1975); Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1993); Alta Indus.
Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1292 n.24 (Utah 1993); Ex reL B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Vt.
1993); Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689, 693 (Va. 1992); State v. Neher, 771
P.2d 330, 351 (Wash. 1989); Pristavec v. Westfield Ins. Co., 400 S.E.2d 575, 581 (W. Va. 1990);
SueAnn A.M. v. Rob S., 500 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Wis. 1993); Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1356
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This intriguing combination of characteristics inspired this Article,
which attempts to remedy some of the neglect and lack of under-
standing of the absurd result principle. The Article focuses on two
questions about the principle: What does it mean? Where does it
get its authority? The Article develops and discusses a definition of
the concept of absurdity as used by the courts. In addition, it
investigates the source of the principle's authority and its implications
for theories of statutory interpretation.
A. The Source of the Principle's Authority
One potential source of authority considered and rejected is the
legislature.' An argument exists that courts may reject plain
meaning because the legislature could not have intended the absurd
result. In other words, the legislature implicitly authorizes courts to
reject any interpretation that will result in absurdity. The absurd
result principle, allowing judges to ignore or rewrite the words of the
legislature, has traditionally been regarded as a threat to legislative
supremacy.'2 This 'implicit legislative intent' justification defused
that threat-or at least seemed to.'
3
The legislative intent justification of the absurd result principle
conflicts with the position of some theorists who reject the concept of
intent in statutory interpretation.'4 Those theorists claim that intent
(Wyo. 1992) (Golden, J., concurring).
10. Both common law and civil law systems utilize the absurd result principle. See Robert
S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and ComparativeAnalysis, inINTERPRETING STATUTeS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 8, at 461,485 (noting that all countries in this study recognize
absurd result principle though its exact form may vary). This study involved the legal systems
of Argentina, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
11. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989)
(Kennedy,J., concurring) (arguing that when strict statutory interpretation results in absurdity,
courts may assume that legislative branch did not intend that interpretation); FBI v. Abramson,
456 U.S. 615, 640 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (recognizing that absurd result principle
may be used when "Congress could not possibly have intended" result); see also Crooks v.
Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) (indicating that to apply absurd result principle, "there must
be something to make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to
prevail").
12. See sources cited infra note 37.
13. SeePublic Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470 (KennedyJ., concurring) (clarifying that absurd result
principle does not threaten legislative power but rather "demonstrates a respect for the coequal
Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way").
14. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 64148 (1990)
[hereinafter Textualism] (describing realist, historicist, and formalist critiques of use of intent
for statutory interpretation). The fact that the principle continues to flourish at present, when
courts are increasingly focusing on a statute's text as the primary (if not the sole) legitimate
referent for interpretation, and when the concept of intent has itself come under increasing
criticism, see generally id., brings into question that traditional justification. Modern currents
toward textualism notwithstanding, however, it is questionable whether the principle has ever
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is neither a legitimate basis of interpretation nor a coherent con-
cept.' 5 But even those who question intent generally endorse the
absurd result principle. 6
The effort to attribute the principle's authority to the legislature
seems to involve more fiction than fact. Cases dealing with the
principle often speak of intent in the form of a presumption that the
legislature always acts reasonably or rationally, at least to the extent
of not intending absurdity." But the discussion of the definition of
absurdity that follows indicates that this presumption of legislative
rationality goes beyond the descriptive, and that in fact it imposes
limits on the effective reach of legislative will. That is, this presump-
tion acts prescriptively.'" This suggests that the absurd result
been based in actual intent. As noted below, see infra note 17 and accompanying text, courts,
while purporting to justify the principle in terms of legislative intent, have in fact often applied
a presumption about intent. Id. The presumption that the legislature could not have intended
an absurdity, if it deals with intent at all, uses an objective notion of intent, that is, the projected
intent of the ideally rational legislator (a close relation of the familiar "reasonable person"). Id.
This objective notion of intent is a construct, and it is a familiar concept in many legal systems.
See D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in INTERPRETING
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 8, at 511, 522-24. In the United States, however,
the subjective notion of intent, the actual intent of actual legislators, has been primary. Id& at
524.
15. SeeMacCormick &Summers, supra note 14, at 524; infra notes 176-77 and accompanying
text.
16. E.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging legitimacy of absurd result principle); Neal v.
Honeywell, 33 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook,J.) (stating absurd result principle).
17. See supra note 11 (collecting cases). This presumption may be merely a courtesy to the
legislature; the absurd result principle may be no more than an acknowledgement that the legal
community (lawmakers, judges, practitioners, and scholars) does not deal in nonsense. More
specifically, one part of this community, the judiciary, will pay the courtesy to another part of
that community, the legislature, to presume that the former acts within the bounds of
rationality. SeePublic Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470 (KennedyJ., concurring) ("When used in a proper
manner, this narrow exception to our normal rule of statutory construction does not intrude
upon the lawmaking powers of Congress, but rather demonstrates a respect for the coequal
Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way."). If this analysis is
correct, it poses an interesting problem given that a similar presumption has been criticized and
rejected as an empirical flaw in traditional legal process thought by some modem theories of
legisprudence, and in fact provides ajumping off point for some of them. See infra Part III.A.2.
This is true of some varieties of law and economics theories that are informed by public choice
models. Some such theories assert that legislators do not act primarily in the pursuit of
reasoned public policy, but rather from self-interest, often an interest in being reelected. See
WItIAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 323-26 (1988). Yet, adherents to these schools of thought
apparently nonetheless embrace the absurd result principle. See Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d 1339, 1345 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.)
(explaining that even "interpretive literalists" reject literal reading of statute when result would
be absurd), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992); Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v.
Swedish Am. Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1372 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,J.)
(recognizing that courts depart from strict statutory interpretation to "avoid absurdity").
18. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (quoting State
v. Clark, 29 N.J. Law 96, 99 (1860), which stated that if literal construction would result in
absurdity, act "must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity," and that court "must restrain the
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principle is not in fact based on intent, or at least not on intent as
generally understood in the U.S. legal system.19 In applying the
absurd result principle, then, it appears that judges give a nod to
legislative supremacy while actually responding to some other
authority entirely, either their own or an authority inhering in neither
the judiciary nor the legislature.20
A presumption about intent removes the conflict that the absurd
result principle creates for those who reject actual intent as a basis of
interpretation.2 This presumption, however, may pose a more
serious challenge to an approach to statutory interpretation based
primarily, if not exclusively, on text, because the application of a
reasonableness presumption may require the judge to deviate from
plain meaning and interpret the statute according to something other
than its words.22 Such a presumption is thus offensive to the view
that only the words of the statute are legitimate law because the words
alone have satisfied the bicameralism and presentment requirements
of the Constitution." If the absurd result principle is in fact
prescriptive, it also has interesting (and to some, possibly disturbing)
implications for our understanding of legislative supremacy and the
role of the judiciary. The implications suggest that there is a
restriction on the lawmaking powers of the legislature, a restriction
whose source is not the Constitution, but one that is nonetheless
applied and enforced by the judiciary.
Whatever other authority judges are actually responding to when
applying the absurd result principle, it is that authority, and not the
authority of the legislature, that legitimizes the principle. The
discussion below, which attempts to define absurdity, points toward
that authority and toward an explanation of why the principle exerts
such a privileged and pervasive influence on statutory interpretation.
words"); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1868) (noting that "[lit will always ... be
presumed" that legislatures intended exceptions to literal reading of statutes to avoid absurd
results).
19. The cases may be using a constructive or objective notion of intent. See supra note 14
and infra note 115.
20. See discussion infra Part III.C.
21. See discussion infra Part IIIA.1-2.
22. See id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Many states have analogous bicameralism and presentment
requirements. E.g., OHIO CONsT. art. II, § 15. This belief is one commonly cited basis for
textualism. See Textualism, supra note 14, at 649-50 (explaining formalist critics' argument that
judicial reliance on legislative history is inconsistent with constitutionally created bicameral
system).
[Vol. 44:127
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B. The Meaning of Absurdity
The term absurd represents a collection of values, best understood
when grouped under the headings of reasonableness, rationality, and
common sense. Based on those values, courts reject certain outcomes
as unacceptable, thereby rejecting the literal interpretations of statutes
when they would result in those outcomes.2 4 As this Article points
out, those values represented by the term absurd accordingly act as a
pervasive check on statutory law,' and are rooted in the rule of law.
The absurd result principle is both a surrogate for, and a representa-
tive of, rule of law values.
The term rule of law has been used to mean a variety of things.
Two common components, however, are: (1) the predictability of the
law, which enables people to rely on it in ordering their affairs, and
to plan their conduct with some confidence and security;26 and (2)
the coherence of the legal system as a whole (that is, that one
standard of law will not contradict another) .27 The recent trend
toward literalism in statutory interpretation has emphasized the first
component: the argument is that only through a system of interpreta-
24. The discussion of definitions also indicates that, contrary to suggestions made by the
comments of some judges, see Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory
Council, 113 S. Ct. 716, 720 (1993) (implying that absurdity has to do with lack of "syllogistic
force"); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 642-43 (1982) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (implying that
majority's deviation from plain meaning would be justified only when plain meaning leads to
absurdity in sense of illogic and not Court's view of "what makes little sense as a matter of public
policy"), the principle is not fundamentally a matter of formal logic, that can be applied
mechanically without any exercise ofjudicial discretion. See infra Part II.B.l.b, II.B.2.
25. See text accompanying infra notes 159-63 (arguing that, though it might be suggested
that absurd result principle is not pervasive but rather operates only rarely, in fact principle is
always in operation and always primary to text, even if it rarely alters outcome that would obtain
in its absence).
26. SeeAntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175 (1989)
(explaining that predictability is important factor in rule of law); see also infra Part III.B.
27. See MacCormick & Summers, supra note 14, at 535 (elaborating on role of rule of law
in maintaining legal coherence); see also infra note 203 and accompanying text. MacCormick
and Summers indicate the complexity of the rule of law doctrine:
[T]he Rule of Law is an internally complex doctrine, which is far from giving
unqualified endorsement to an unfettered legislative supremacy. As well as stressing
the necessity for clear ex ante legislation regulating the use of coercive power, the Rule
of Law is commonly understood as setting conditions for the proper exercise of
legislative power, for example banning or restricting retrospection, and stipulating
reasonable generality, clarity and constancy in the law. It also sets strict conditions on
the legitimacy of coercion under criminal or penal law. In general terms, respect for
the Rule of Law is expressed or expressible in terms of the postulate that a legal system
must exhibit, and be interpreted as exhibiting, a relatively high degree of coherence
as a normative system.
MacCormick & Summers, supra note 14, at 535.
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tion limited to the words of the statute can we hope to have clear and
predictable rules, and therefore a system under the rule of law.28
A strict literalism, however, can undermine the rule of law because
it can work against the second component, the coherence of the legal
system as a whole. For example, a literal interpretation that results in
absurdity is likely to offend some other legal principle.29 Thus, if the
literal meaning is enforced, it will establish a precedent in conflict
with other parts of the legal system, and will thereby undermine the
system's coherence. The absurd result principle tempers literalism,
and the principle of legislative supremacy which literalism is meant to
serve, by restraining both according to a collection of values that
provide coherence and legitimacy to the legal system.
Understood in this way, the absurd result principle becomes not the
enemy of literalism, but a necessary component of literalism, without
which literalism could not serve the rule of law. As such, the absurd
result principle is not subservient to the principle of legislative
supremacy, but actually legitimizes the legislative role. The perceived
tension between the two principles is not something that requires
resolution or elimination. Rather, these two principles, like the
underlying values they represent, are complementary; they appropri-
ately remain in dynamic tension with each other, to be balanced in
any interpretive act. Grounding the absurd result principle in the
rule of law explains its presence throughout history and across legal
systems, and its acceptance by people of widely varying legisprudential
leanings.
Part I begins with a brief sketch of the historical development of
the absurd result principle in the Anglo-American legal system. Part
II proposes and discusses possible definitions for the concept of
absurdity, and tests the definitions in light of the archetypal examples
courts use to illustrate the principle, and also in light of one of the
modem cases dealing with the principle. Part III concludes the
Article with suggestions regarding the implications of the principle for
theories of statutory interpretation.
28. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule
of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 543 (1992) (outlining and questioning formalist arguments that
reliance on plain meaning in interpretation fosters rule of law by, among other things,
promoting clear rules); Scalia, supra note 26, at 1179 (noting that clear rules promote certainty,
which in turn promotes Rule of Law).
29. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABSURD RESULT PRINCIPLE
The absurd result principle appears in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century in Britain."0 It is seen in the jurisprudence of
the U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1819.31 The principle became a
part of what has been referred to as the golden rule of statutory
interpretation. 2 The golden rule was grounded in ordinary mean-
ing, but provided specific exceptions in the event of absurdity or
certain other variously stated consequences. 3 It is said to have
30. See, e.g., Wansey v. Perkins, 135 Eng. Rep. 55, 63 (C.P. 1845) (Cresswell,J.) ("It may be
laid down as a safe rule, in the construction of acts of parliaments, that we are to look at the
words of the act and to render them strictly, unless manifest absurdity or injustice should result
from such a construction."); Perry v. Skinner, 150 Eng. Rep. 843, 845 (Ex. 1837) (Parke, B.)
("The rule by which we are to be guided in construing acts of Parliament is to look at the
precise words, and to construe them in their ordinary sense, unless it would lead to any
absurdity or manifest injustice."); Becke v. Smith, 150 Eng. Rep. 724, 726 (Ex. 1836) (Parke, B.)
(stating "useful rule" that courts adhere to ordinary meaning of statute unless interpretation
"leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance"); see also Corry, supra note 8, at 299-300 & nn.71-
76 (noting development of absurdity exception to literalism and citing cases).
In 1765, Blackstone made several references to absurdity asjustifying either a deviation from
literal meaning or the voiding of an act of Parliament with regard to absurd consequences. He
noted: "As to the effects and consequence [of statutes], the rule is, that where words bear either
none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the
received sense of them." 1 WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *61
(1st ed. 1765) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES]. Later in the same volume, when
describing the principal "rules to be observed with regard to the construction of statutes," id.
at *87, Blackstone noted: "[I]f there arise out of [acts of parliament] . . . any absurd
consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those
collateral consequences, void," id. at *91.
31. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 202-03 (1819) (discussing absurdity as
justifying departure from plain meaning of words); see also United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482,
486 (1868) (arguing that statutory terms should be interpreted to avoid "injustice, oppression,
or an absurd consequence").
32. See Corry, supra note 8, at 299 (describing how "golden rule" was created in reaction to
strict literalism that would not have allowed exception even for absurdity) (citations omitted).
The rule was distilled by commentators from various judicial statements about how statutes
should be interpreted. SeejIM EVANS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICA-
TION 10 (1988). Although it is not clear who first christened this approach the "golden rule,"
it has been attributed to Lord Wensleydale. See id. (quoting Lord Blackburn's statement in River
Wear v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 743, 764 (1877), that Lord Wensleydale used to call it the golden
rule).
33. See, e.g., Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 56 (1892) (indicating that laws
should be construed to avoid absurd and unjust results); Heyenfeldt v. Daney Cold & Silver
Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634, 638 (1876) (same); Kirby, 74 U.S. at 486 (maintaining that construction
of statutes should avoid injustice, oppression, and absurdity); Peny, 150 Eng. Rep. at 845
(construing act of Parliament to avoid "absurdity or manifest injustice"), cited in Corry, supra
note 8, at 299.
Treating consequences other than absurdity asjustifying a deviation from plain meaning has
been criticized:
It is urged.., that if the literal meaning of the statute be as indicated above, that
meaning should be rejected as leading to absurd results, and a construction adopted
in harmony with what is thought to be the spirit and purpose of the act in order to
give effect to the intent of Congress. The principle ... is to be applied to override the
literal terms of a statute only under rare and exceptional circumstances. The
illustrative cases cited in the opinion demonstrate that, to justify a departure from the
letter of the law upon that ground, the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the
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developed in reaction to a strict literal approach, which itself
developed as a natural corollary to the late eighteenth century
recognition of the supremacy of the British Parliament. 4 The
golden rule, with its absurdity exception, was thus born out of an
attempt to resolve the tension between the principle of legislative
supremacy and the occasionally objectionable results of the strict
literalism that legislative supremacy was assumed to logically re-
quire. 5
Reflecting the inception of the golden rule, many courts and
commentators have historically perceived the absurd result principle
to be in tension with legislative supremacy. Courts often justify the
principle in terms of legislative intent, 6 perhaps to minimize this
tension, or perhaps to mask it. By presuming that the legislature
general moral or common sense ....
Courts have sometimes exercised a high degree of ingenuity in the effort to find
justification for wrenching from the words of a statute a meaning which literally they
did not bear in order to escape consequences thought to be absurd or to entail great
hardship. But an application of the principle so nearly approaches the boundary
between the exercise of the judicial power and that of the legislative power as to call
rather for great caution and circumspection in order to avoid usurpation of the latter.
Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930) (citations omitted). Frederick de Sloov6re took
a similar view:
[T] he presumption of the Golden Rule of reasonable interpretation on the part of the
legislature in order to avoid absurdities is a genuine process if the meaning reached
is one that the words will bear by fair use of language. The doctrine of literalness,
however, does not permit avoiding the single sensible meaning that in application in
particular cases gives an unjust, inequitable, or inconvenient result.
de Sloovbre, supra note 8, at 601.
34. See Corry, supra note 8, at 298-99 (explaining development of golden rule as
modification to doctrine of literalism).
35. See Corry, supra note 8, at 299 (explaining that golden rule avoided harsh consequences
of literal interpretation and prevented courts from encroaching on legislative powers).
36. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that when absurdity would result from literal statutory
interpretation, court need not follow literal meaning); Territory of Haw. v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197, 212-14 (1903) (explaining that "[iut will always ... be presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language" to avoid absurd results); Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892) (explaining that use of absurd result principle
assumes legislative intent and is not substitution of "the will of the judge for that of the
legislator"); Kirby, 74 U.S. at 486-87 (declining to give statute literal interpretation because result
would mean legislature intended absurd result).
Blackstone seems to have attempted to minimize this tension essentially by ignoring it, 1
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *90-91. He asserted that the legislature has the
right to "enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable" and thatjudges have no right to reject
such a statute. Id. at *91. Yet he allowed that a court may disregard the statute, or consider it
void, as to unreasonable consequences. Id. He couched this allowance for judicial disregard
of the statute's plain meaning in terms of the intent of the legislature, suggesting that those
consequences may be assumed by the court not to have been intended. Id. "But where some
collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable, there the
judges are, in decency, to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the Parliament,
and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and quoad hoc disregard it."
Id.
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would not intend absurd consequences, the court avoids the appear-
ance that it is infringing on legislative supremacy when it rejects a
plain meaning that would result in absurdity.37
With this approach, the intent and supremacy of the legislature
formally prevail. In practice, however, judges can avoid unreasonable
consequences by assuming that the legislature did not really mean
what it said. The presumption imposes limits on the effective reach
of legislative will: legislators will not be allowed to intend an
absurdity, or, even if they do, the courts will not enforce it.3 8
An early Supreme Court decision, Kirby v. United States,39 provides
a good example both in historical terms and in terms of the
principle's present application." Kirby involved a statute that
37. Historically, this offered justification did not entirely resolve the perceived tension
between the absurd result principle and the principle of legislative supremacy. Apparently, the
theoretical question remained whether the legislature could enact an absurdity. For some, the
perceived tension was irresolvable, and required the rejection of the absurd result principle, or
at least its relegation to a position subsidiary to literal meaning, to be used only in cases of
ambiguity. SeeAltrincham Elec. Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sale Urban Dist. Council, 154 L.T.R. 379,388
(1936) (Macmillan, LJ.). Lord Macmillan stated:
[B]y what criterion are your Lordships to judge whether a particular enactment, if
literally read, is so absurd that Parliament cannot have intended it to be so read and
that the courts ought not to give effect to its plain meaning? I agree with Lord
Bramwell who said that [the absurd result principle] "opens a very wide door" and
adds: "I should like to have a good definition of what is such an absurdity that you are
to disregard the plain words of an Act of Parliament. It is to be remembered that what
seems absurd to one man does not seem absurd to another...."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Hopkins, supra note 2, at 695 (warning that absurd result
principle threatens basis of literal interpretation theory). Hopkins writes: "[T]he absurdity
clause has a relative and variable content which threatens the entire foundation of literal theory.
Literal interpretation means nothing if plain words may be qualified according to common sense
and justice as conceived judicially." Id. Hopkins recognized that the judicial role necessarily
entails some discretion, but supported restricting that discretion as much as possible in order
to secure to the legislature its proper functions, and to protect it from encroachment by the
judiciary. Id. at 695-96. This is identical to the position of some modern literalists and other
formalists. See Textualism, supra note 14, at 648 (describing position of critics who oppose broad
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation in part because it allows too much room for
judicial discretion in interpretation of statutes).
38. Stated like this, the judicially created presumption poses an outright challenge to
legislative supremacy that might be attacked as illegitimate. Perhaps that is why it is not stated
in these terms. Or at least, even if the presumption is stated quite strongly, there may be some
formal -allowance made for its rebuttal, by clear, express, and unambiguous indication of
legislative intent to the contrary. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
This brings to mind so-called "clear statement" rules, according to which the Supreme Court
in recent years has required an extraordinarily clear expression of legislative intent to rebut a
judicial presumption, for example, that Congress did not intend an interpretation of a statute
that would raise constitutional questions. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469-70
(1991) (interpreting statute so not as to intrude on state government functions). See generally
William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992) (outlining concerns about Supreme
Court's "super-strong" clear statement rules).
39. 74 U.S. 482 (1868).
40. See, e.g., Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 113 S. Ct.
716, 720 n.3 (1993) (citing Kirby and other cases applying absurd result principle from Kirby to
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prohibited a person from "knowingly and willfully obstruct[ing] or
retard[ing] the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier."41
Defendant Kirby was a county sheriff who had a bench warrant
commanding him to arrest a man named Farris, who, in addition to
having been indicted for murder, also happened to be a mail
carrier.4 2 Kirby and his posse arrested Farris while he was carrying
the mail, and were indicted for violating the statute.43 The Court
ruled that the statute did not apply to the situation before it.44
Though presented with authority supporting a strict application of
the statute's text,45 the Court did not follow the literal language.46
Instead, the Court set up a presumption with regard to legislative
intent. It began by saying that no legislative intention to exempt mail
carriers from such an arrest "should be attributed to Congress unless
clearly manifested by its language,"4 7 and then continued:
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which
would avoid results of this character The reason of the law in such
cases should prevail over its letter.4"
In Kirby, the Court enunciated a strong presumption about
outcome considerations. The Court did not attempt to justify the
presumption in terms of actual legislative intent.49 Rather, the
principle stands on its own. Its authority derives from its pedigree
and, more fundamentally, from common sense:
present); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 352 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that absurd result principle is venerable rule of statutory
interpretation); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 699 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that court should have applied absurd result principle rather than relying on Due
Process Clause for its decision); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 198 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (rejecting literal interpretation of statute to avoid absurdity).
41. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 483 (1868) (citing 4 Stat. 104 (1825)).
42. Id. at 484.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 487.
45. See id. at 484 (quoting authorities supporting strict application of statute according to
its terms).
46. See id. at 486-87 (emphasizing that when absurd consequences may result, "the reason
of the law ... should prevail over its letter").
47. Id. at 486. This sounds remarkably like the very strong version of a clear statement rule
requiring express evidence in the text of the statute to overcome a presumption against an
interpretation that would raise constitutional questions. See supra note 38 and accompanying
text (discussing presumption that legislatures do not intend absurdity).
48. Kirby, 74 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 486 (stating that Court should not impute congressional intention to exempt
sheriff from arrest "unless clearly manifested by... [statute's] language").
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The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned
by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, 'that whoever
drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost
severity,' did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a
person that fell down in the street in a fit. The same common
sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st
Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks from prison
shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks
out when the prison is on fire-'for he is not to be hanged because
he would not stay to be burnt.' 0
The Bolognian law and the statute of 1st Edward II are both
archetypes referred to throughout the history of the absurd result
principle, even to the present., Indeed, these archetypes are the
nearest thing we have to a legal definition of absurdity. They act as
examples of the appropriate use of the principle, often suggesting by
comparison that the situation before the court falls short of the
absurdity that justifies an exception to plain meaning.5 2  Because
these archetypes enjoy universal acceptance and are continually
utilized to illustrate the principle, this Article initially discusses the
possible definitions of absurdity in light of them. Then it analyzes a
recent case using those definitions."5
II. THE MEANING OF ABSURDITY IN THE CONTEXT OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
As previously mentioned, the cases applying the absurd result
principle neither define absurdity nor discuss the reasoning behind
the principle. 4 Rather, they merely refer to it, sometimes as a
"venerable principle,""5 and then invoke vintage illustrations to
50. Id. at 487.
51. See, e.g., Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 113 S. Ct.
716, 720 n.3 (1993) (citing pages in Kirly that refer to these archetypes); Public Citizen v.
United States Dep'tofJustice, 491 U.S. 440,471 (1989) (KennedyJ., concurring) (reciting these
two archetypes as examples of"true absurdity"); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324
n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reciting these two archetypes
as contained in Kirby and rejectingJustice Brennan's approach, which would disregard statute's
language when absurdity would not result); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 447 (1932)
(referring to these two "classical illustrations found in Puffendorf and Plowden" and listing
Court's application of absurdity principle in earlier cases); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892) (reciting these two archetypes as contained in Kirby); 1
BLAc=sONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *61 (reciting classic example from Puffendorf
and suggesting that it is necessary to deviate from literal interpretation of rule if it is absurd).
52. See, e.g., Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470-71.
53. See infra Part II.
54. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
55. See K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 324 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that "it is in a venerable principle that the law will not be interpreted to produce
absurd results"); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452
1994]
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confirm that description.56 The classic illustrations noted in Kirby
appear frequently, 7 but they are not cited by courts for purposes of
factual analogy. In other words, the illustrations are not used because
they involve similar fact patterns, and therefore justify the application
of the same legal rule. Nor are they chosen because they involve
similar statutory matters and so provide a legal analogy. Rather, it is
the absurd result principle itself that is relied on, and it is notjustified
by argument, but is rather directly invoked by the judge."
The cases defy categorization in terms of the meaning they give to
the notion of absurdity. Though a definition does not leap from the
cases,59 however, an examination of theoretically possible definitions
does reveal the contours of the term. Accordingly, the following
discussion suggests and considers several possible definitions and, in
turn, identifies some of the underlying values that the absurd result
principle represents and protects.
(1987) (ScaliaJ., concurring) (using "venerable principle" language); United States v. Watson,
788 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992) (saying that suggested broad interpretation of statute
governing crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine near school would violate this
"venerable principle") (quoting KMart); see also Rowland, 113 S. Ct. at 720 (calling absurd result
principle "common mandate of statutory construction").
56. Occasionally, a judge offers something beyond citations and the traditional examples
embodied in them. SeePublic Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470-71 (KennedyJ., concurring) (asserting that
exception to plain meaning is justified only "where the result of applying the plain language
would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress could have
intended the result,... and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most
anyone"). After these attempts at clarification, however, Justice Kennedy retreated to the
archetypal "examples of true absurdity," mentioning the situation in Kirby and the classic
illustration found in Puffendorf. Id. at 471. Likewise, Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819), attempted to describe the absurdity necessary to trigger the
principle by reaching beyond the traditional examples. He said that the absurdity and the
injustice thatjustify disregarding plain meaning must be "so monstrous, that all mankind would,
without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application." Id. at 203; see also Crooks v. Harrelson,
282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) ("[T]o justify a departure from the letter of the law .... the absurdity
must be so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense."); In re Rose, 86 B.R. 86, 89
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (stating that "ludicrous" is synonymous with "absurd").
57. See supra note 51.
58. See supra note 51 (citing cases where principle was invoked but not justified by
argument). On occasion, ajudge will elaborate on the implications of the literal reading of the
statute in an attempt to demonstrate that absurdity results from such a reading. See Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 474 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's
reading of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which determines sentence
in part by adding weight of substance in which LSD is carried to weight of LSD itself, would
result in grossly inconsistent sentences for sales of identical amounts of drug, depending merely
on type of carrier (e.g., sugar cube, blotter paper or orangejuice) in or on which LSD was sold).
59. Indeed some claim that it is not possible to define absurdity sufficiently to create a clear
rule as to whether an interpretation leads to absurdity in any particular case. See de Sloovare,
supra note 8, at 600-01 (arguing that judges must use their training, experience, and sense of
what is right and just when deciding whether particular meaning of statute is absurd).
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A. A Plain Meaning Approach: Dictionary Definitions of Absurd
The dictionary, a source often used by courts to determine the
meaning of words, is an appropriate first source in the search for a
definition of absurdity pertinent to the absurd result principle.'6
Dictionary definitions include: (1) "clearly untrue or unreasonable;
ridiculously inconsistent with reason, or the plain dictates of common
sense; logically contradictory";6' (2) "not in accordance with com-
mon sense, very unsuitable";62 and (3) "ridiculous, foolish."6 3
The dictionary definitions can be grouped into two broad, basic
categories. The first has to do with formal logic. The second, which
is more diverse, deals with truth, rationality or reasonableness, and
common sense. These definitions suggest the kinds of things that the
absurd result principle guards within the legal system. The concepts
are quite abstract. The several possible types of absurdity suggested
must be explored in greater detail and within the context of statutory
interpretation.
B. Possible Varieties of the Absurd in the Context of Statutory
Interpretation
1. Absurdity as a concept offormal logic
One possible form of absurdity in legislation involves formal logic.
There are at least two ways in which a statute could be absurd in this
sense. First, there is the illogic of internal contradiction. Second,
there is the illogic of flawed deductive reasoning, that is, a flaw in the
application of a rule in a particular set of circumstances.
60. See, e.g., Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462 (using dictionary to determine meaning of "mixture"
in Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control Act);John Doe Agencyv.John Doe
Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989) (discussing dictionary definition of "compiled" for use in
interpreting Freedom of Information Act); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979)
(using dictionary definition of "property" to determine that term as used in the Clayton Act
includes money). The courts apparently do not use the term absurd in any technical sense,
which would make the dictionary an inappropriate research aid. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S.
304, 306-07 (1893) (suggesting that words in statutes should be understood in their ordinary
sense unless some special technical sense is indicated, and that dictionary is appropriate aid to
understanding ordinary meaning).
61. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 8 (2d ed. 1983). The following
synonyms are listed: "foolish, irrational, ridiculous, preposterous, silly, unreasonable,
nonsensical." Id.
62. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 5 (1st ed. 1980).
63. Id. Reflecting the tendency of courts to tie the absurdity exception to legislative intent,
Black's Law Dictionary defines absurdity as "[a]nything which is so irrational, unnatural, or
inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of men of ordinary
intelligence and discretion. Obviously and flatly opposed to the manifest truth; inconsistentwith
the plain dictates of common sense; logically contradictory; nonsensical; ridiculous." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 10 (5th ed. 1979).
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a. The illogic of internal contradiction
A purported absurdity could lie in the statute itself, in that the rule
expressed therein is internally contradictory, and for that reason
illogical. An example would be a statute that provided:
Anyone who does A is guilty of X; and, anyone who does A is
not guilty of X.
This general rule can be expressed as the major premise of a
syllogism:
If p then q; and, ifp then not q.
The absurdity lies in the internal contradiction of the law's directive,
entirely apart from its application to any particular set of facts.
It is difficult to find a case that illustrates this type of absurdity.
Even though there may be disagreement about the precise contours
of the term absurd in statutory interpretation, it is reassuring to find
that the absurd result principle's presumption of a rational legislature
comports with reality at least to the extent that blatantly self-contradic-
tory laws are rare. 4
But this does not close consideration of this category altogether.
If, as the language of some cases suggests, the presumption of a
reasonable legislature is merely descriptive,65 then the empirical
challenge made to that description by public choice theory66 leads
to the theoretical possibility that a legislature could pass a law that was
absurd in the sense of logically contradictory. Some public choice
scholars have presented a picture of the legislature as a marketplace,
with interest groups making up the demand side for legislation, and
64. Rare, but apparently not unheard of, as rules have evolved to deal with just such
situations. See EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTiON OF STATUTES § 166 (1940) (noting and
commenting on rules for dealing with conflicting provisions of statutes, including provisions that
are irreconcilable); REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 228
& n.31 (1975) (referring to rules developed to decide cases that cannot be resolved by actual
meaning, and giving example of "the rule adopted in some jurisdictions, that if two provisions
of the same statute unresolvably contradict each other, the later one prevails"). In some
jurisdictions, these rules have even been codified. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.52
(Baldwin 1992) (providing that if amendments to same statute "are substantively irreconcilable,
the latest in date of enactment prevails").
65. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
66. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 17, at 49 (commenting that public choice theory
involves economic analysis of political science, and that "[o]ne prominent aspect of public
choice theory has been the creation of models that treat the legislative process as a microcco-
nomic system in which 'actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and
groups to further their own interests'") (quoting Gary S. Becker, A Theoy of Competition Among
Pressure Groups for Political Influenc, 98 QJ. ECON. 371, 371 (1983)); see also supra note 64 (noting
existence of such laws, as evidenced by rules developed to deal with them). See generally Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873,890-99 (1987)
(discussing economic theory of legislation).
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legislators as suppliers whose primary motivation is to maximize their
chances at reelection.6  Because in this scenario a legislator's
primary goal is reelection and not reasoned deliberation, one can
imagine key legislators making deals with interest groups in exchange
for the funds and friends needed to secure victory.s This is, after
all, the picture given by public choice theory. And there are no logic
or consistency constraints on the process; there is only the utility-
maximization of economic man.6
9
What would we do with a law that was logically contradictory?
Would courts strain to interpret it in a way that avoided the contradic-
tion? If a noncontradictory interpretation could not be devised
except by giving the words of the statute a meaning they would not
bear (stretching them beyond any acceptable usage), would a court
be forced, by the principles of legislative supremacy and separation of
powers, to enforce the law as written (perhaps noting that it did so
with regret, but that it was up to the legislature to remedy the
contradiction)?
But how could a law like this be enforced? How can a person be
found both guilty and not guilty? Faced with such an impossibility,
would the court choose instead to either nullify or rewrite the statute
because it was absurd as written?7 If the court chose the latter path,
should it strive to find the legislative purpose or intent of the law, and
rewrite it according to that purpose or interest?71 If judges were to
67. See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 66. As Farber and Frickey point out, though
later public choice scholarship provides more sophisticated models, avoiding some of the
reductionism of early research, "the legal literature... has not always advanced beyond the early
[reductionist] models." Id. at 875.
68. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 66, at 891 (stating assumption of economic models that
legislators must maximize likelihood of their reelection). See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA,
CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977) (explaining that rational
choice theory is based on assumption that primary goal of legislators is to be reelected).
69. This is not to suggest that the economic model is illogical or inconsistent. However,
logic and consistency are not, according to that model, independent constraints on activity or
outcome. Rather, it is more accurate to say of at least some versions of the model that whatever
outcomes the system produces are assumed at the outset to be rational per se-
70. See 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *91 (stating that "acts of
parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity," and that if any absurdity
results from them, they are void with respect to those consequences). Another alternative would
be to follow the legislature's own directive for such situations, if one exists. See supra note 64.
71. Construing the words of a statute in light of the statute's purpose or legislative intent
is a traditional approach to statutory interpretation. See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625, 634-
35 (1982) (choosing interpretation that "more accurately reflects the intention of Congress ....
and more fully serves the purposes of the statute," despite dissent's claim that interpretation
ignored plain meaning of words); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,459
(1892) ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."). See
generally HENRY M. HARTJR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1157 (tentative ed. 1958) [hereinafter THE LEGAL PROCESS]
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follow this course, they might encounter the objection that there is no
actual intent of the legislature, and no purpose other than the deal
as struck by Congress.72 If judges did rewrite the statute, would they
be justly accused of engaging in judicial legislation, and of overstep-
ping their proper role?73  Or would such an action instead be
justified under the absurd result principle as legitimately within the
power and traditional role of the court?74 Which would we expect,
and which would we counsel? And, perhaps most importantly, why?
Although the definition of absurdity as involving internal contradic-
tion depicts an extreme case, the questions generated by it highlight
some fundamental issues concerning the absurd result principle.
First, they illustrate the historically perceived tension between the
absurd result principle and the principle of legislative supremacy.7'
Second, the questions point out several problems with some ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation. For example, they show a core
problem with a literalism divorced from considerations of legislative
intent or purpose.76  In addition, they show a similar problem with
making either legislative intent or the text of the statute the primary
referent for statutory interpretation.77 Finally, the questions raised
by this definition of absurdity suggest the theoretical necessity of an
(describing "purpose" approach to interpreting statutes); Textualism, supra note 14, at 626
(noting that legislative history is usually relevant to meaning of ambiguous statute); Arthur W.
Murphy, Old Maxims NeverDie: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutoiy Interpretation in the "Modernm "
Federal Courts, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1299 (1975) ("[I]t is an article of faith among American
lawyers that the function of a court when dealing with a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature.").
72. See Textualism, supra note 14, at 640-44 (briefly summarizing critiques of concept of
legislative intent, based on schools of thought such as legal realism, law and economics, and
public choice theory).
73. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989)
(KennedyJ, concurring) (accusing majority of "'substituti~ng] (its own] pleasure to that of the
legislative body'") (alteration by KennedyJ.; quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 575
(1982) (citing Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930), and noting that remedy for
dissatisfaction with outcome of statute lies with Congress); Crooks, 282 U.S. at 59-60 (cautioning
that remedy for laws thought to be absurd should in most cases lie with legislatures, not courts).
74. See, e.g., Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Wrhen used in a
proper manner, this narrow exception to our normal rule of statutory construction does not
intrude upon the lawmaking powers of Congress, but rather demonstrates a respect for the
coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way."); Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,527 (1989) (ScaliaJ., concurring) (declaring that when literal
interpretation produces absurd result, it is task of Court to give some alternative meaning to
statute); Armstrong Paint &Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315,333 (1938) ("[T]o
construe statutes so as to avoid results glaringly absurd, has long been a judicial function.").
75. See supra notes 23, 36 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting theory that courts may reject plain
meaning because legislature did not intend absurd results).
77. See infra Part III (arguing need for absurd result principle's overarching restraint on
both text and intent, in order to maintain coherence of legal system as whole).
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absurd result principle that would cover at least the situation in which
a statute was internally contradictory.7'
b. The illogic of a flaw in deductive reasoning
There is a second way in which a statute could involve absurdity in
terms of formal logic. The logical flaw may reside not in the words
themselves (that is, it may not be the illogic of self-contradiction), but
rather in the deductive process of applying those words to a particular
set of facts (that is, it may be the illogic of arriving at a conclusion
contradictory of the premises of the syllogism).
To illustrate, consider the following statute:
Any person driving faster than 55 mph shall be guilty of
speeding.
This rule can be restated as:
If p then q.
Suppose a man is brought before a judge for speeding. The man
does not dispute the fact that he was driving at a speed greater than
55 mph. Thus, p exists. If the judge finds the man not guilty (not q),
the result is strictly illogical in that the conclusion is contradictory of
the combination of the rule and the fact of p.
As a matter of deductive reasoning, the application of the statute
to these facts would read:
Any person driving faster than 55 mph shall be guilty of
speeding.
Mr. X was driving faster than 55 mph.
Mr. X is not guilty of speeding.




This absurdity rests not in any internal contradiction in the law (the
rule or major premise), but rather in the reasoning that results in an
illogical deduction from that premise. What would be done with a
law, or rather, an application of a law, that involved absurdity in this
sense? The problem presented here as compared to the first
potential definition of absurdity, where the statute itself was internally
contradictory, clearly is one of applying the law, and therefore is more
arguably within the bailiwick of the judge.79
78. See infra Part III.
79. See supra note 74 (citing cases indicating that interpretation is traditional role ofjudge);
cf. de Sloovfre, supra note 8, at 600-01 (stating that judges must use their discretion when
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Is it conceivable that such a thing could occur? One can think of
several situations in which it might. The man may have been
speeding because his brakes had given out on a steep hill. Or he may
have been the judge's brother-in-law.
Ajudge faced with the logical problem that this outcome presents
(that is, finding a person who has clearly committed p not guilty, or
not q) might be expected to attempt to resolve or, depending on her
motives, obscure it in some way. The following approaches, each
relating to one of the steps in the syllogism, are among those available
to the judge.
First, and perhaps most obviously, the judge may find the man
guilty. This would resolve the absurdity because the conclusion
(guilty) follows logically from the premises. The argument and




A second option would be for the judge to focus on the minor
premise (p exists). If the facts confronting the judge can be under-
stood as not constituting p, then the statute is not triggered and the
logical problem stemming from its application does not arise.
It is difficult in this situation to imagine how the facts could be
construed so as not to fall within the rule as stated. It is not difficult,
however, to imagine a judge faced with an outcome objectionable
either to him personally or in terms of other legal principles and
notions of justice, straining so to portray the facts that they will not
fall within the reach of an apparently applicable legal rule.8"
This maneuver strikes one as illicit. Perhaps that is because the
illogic or absurdity of the original example remains where the rule is
not enforced merely because the judge renames the facts rwhen they
are apparent to most onlookers as in fact constituting p.
If there is some legitimate reason why the rule should not be
enforced in this situation, a less objectionable approach might be to
look to the rule itself to see if there might be latent within it some
exception for ps of the particular kind confronting the judge. The
judge might look to see if the rule applies not, in fact, to all ps, but
only to some subset, p', which does not include the situation at hand.
This is the third alternative open to the judge who wants to avoid
determining meaning of absurd statute).
80. At least in those reported cases not involving dissents, it is unlikely that this approach
could be discerned, because the judge's portrayal of the facts would be the only one available
to the reader, and thus the reader would not be aware that the reality was otherwise.
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applying the rule to the speeding man, but also wants to avoid the
absurdity of: Ifp then q; p, but not q. The judge can focus on the
major premise, the legal rule, and interpret it so that it does not
require q in this instance."1 This approach is apparently more
legitimate than reconstruing the facts because it involves the
interpretation of a legal rule, which is a traditional judicial function.
Of course, this third approach may be no less of a strategic
maneuver than the second alternative, in which the judge reconstrues
the factual situation to avoid triggering the legal rule.82 If it is
merely an attempt to avoid what the judge perceives as an objection-
able result, it is likely to be viewed as illegitimate."
That is true except in one instance: if the result avoided is itself
absurd. For of course it is a "venerable principle" that ajudge shall
construe a statute to avoid an absurd result.8 4
But what sort of absurdity is this? Surely not the one this section
has addressed so far, the absurdity of formal logic resulting from the
application of a legal rule in an illogical manner (Ifp then q; p, but not
q).5 This sort of absurdity arises only when that latter type is
avoided, that is, when the rule is applied to the facts at hand (so, If
p then q; p, therefore q), and when the result of that logical application
is what is being called absurd.
81. See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 (1982) (construing exemption to Freedom of
Information Act disclosure requirements for documents compiled for law enforcement purposes
to also cover documents containing information from such sources, but created for other
purposes).
82. See supra text accompanying note 80. In that alternative, the judge reconstrued the facts
so that the minor premise (p exists) was not satisfied.
83. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 695-96 (condemning absurd result principle for allowing
judges to ignore clear words of legislature in order to avoid outcomes judges find objection-
able); see also de Sloov~re, supra note 8, at 602-03 (asserting that "judicial construction... must
not become judicial legislation by seeking to contradict the plain meaning by a supposed
legislative policy or purpose or by a so-called equity of the statute").
84. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is a venerable principle that a law will not be interpreted to
produce absurd results."); United States v. Watson, 788 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992) (quoting
Justice Scalia's reference to absurd result principle in K Mart to discredit Government's
argument that federal drug prevention statute should be broadly interpreted); de Sloovwre, supra
note 8, at 600-01 (pointing out that absurdity is only situation in which it is legitimate for judge
to interpret to avoid certain outcome, and emphasizing that other outcomes, such as injustice,
inequity, and inconvenience, do not justify avoiding single statutory meaning); id. ("Now
suppose that the single meaning is mischievous or absurd. If mischievous and the only meaning,
it must be followed; if absurd, it is probably not the only meaning; but if it is, the statute must
be regarded as unenforceable."). De Sloov~re posited that the potential for misuse is inherent
in the absurdity principle because it is fundamentally a matter ofjudicial discretion. Id. at 601.
As such, its proper use is dependent upon the skill, good faith, and common sense of the judge.
Id.
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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To illustrate the kind of absurdity that would allow a judge to
legitimately follow this third alternative and reconstrue a legal rule in
order to avoid its application in a particular situation (thereby
achieving not q while avoiding the illogic of If p then q; p, but not q),
substitute for the speeding driver the man who drew blood in the
streets in medieval Bologna. Recall that the legal rule involved there
was essentially the following:
Anyone who draws blood in the streets shall be punished with
the utmost severity."'
Or:
If a person draws blood in the streets, then that person shall
be punished with the utmost severity.
Or:
If p, then q.
The surgeon involved in this case apparently was considered to have
"drawn blood in the streets" by opening the vein of the man who had
fallen down in a fit." (Otherwise, the case would not have generat-
ed debate and we would never have heard of it.) P apparently existed
and yet, "after long debate,"88 the law was held not to apply.8 9
Thus we have:
If p then q.
P
But not q.90
This is precisely the formulation proposed in this section as a form
of logical absurdity. And yet the resolution has been justified as
having been necessary to avoid an absurd result.91 Why? We do not
have the details of the long debate that led to that resolution. We do
know that the surgeon was not punished under the statute. And we
know that this very outcome has been consistently and continually
used as an archetypal example of legitimate statutory construction to
avoid an absurd result.92
86. See 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *60 (reciting classic application
of absurd result principle).
87. See 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *60 (distinguishing surgeon who
opened vein of ill person from other actors who might "draw blood in the street").
88. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *60.
89. See 1 BLAcysTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *60 (stating that punishment did
not extend to surgeon in this situation).
90. 1 BACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *60.
91. See 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *60 (remarking that "absurd
significations" require deviations from literal meaning of text); see also supra note 51 (citing cases
supporting this result).
92. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Westgate Partners, 937 F.2d 526, 529-30 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. wooden, 832
F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); supra note 51 (citing additional cases).
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If there is an absurdity here that legitimizes, via the absurd result
principle, a judge's reinterpretation of a legal rule in order to avoid
a particular outcome (and the authority is overwhelming that there
is), that absurdity is not a matter of formal logic. For it was absurdity
in the sense of formal logic that would have resulted had the penalty
not been imposed (but not q). And if we wish to secure just that
outcome (not q) on the ground that imposing the penalty in this
situation would be absurd, we cannot look to formal logic for a
definition of this sense of absurdity.9"
Yet this situation and others like it seem to have called out for
resolution, and judges have found justification for their resolution in
the absurd result principle. 4 What sort of justification does that
principle represent? Though consistent with logic (through an
implicit reconstruction of the rule), this avoidance of absurd results
does not find its justification in logic, as would be the case where the
absurdity avoided was of the type inhering in either Ifp then q; p, but
not q,95 or If p then q; and if p then not q.96 Instead, the justification
for the absurdity principle seems to lie elsewhere.
The traditional justification links the principle to legislative
intent. 7 This Article has already alluded to several reasons why it
seems unlikely that legislative intent provides the justification for the
absurd result principle. 8 Another is indicated by the reasoning
93. This is not to suggest that in avoiding an absurd result in this way a court violates the
principles of logical reasoning. The illogic of Ifp then q; p, but not q can be said to be avoided
by an implicit reconstruction of the statute to provide If p' then q. But, whereas in most
situations it would be considered illegitimate for a judge to alter because of outcome
considerations the interpretation that would otherwise be preferred, in the case of the absurd
outcome, it is not only considered legitimate to do so, it is in fact generally agreed to be
illegitimate not to do so. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore
Foods, 960 F.2d 1339, 1345 (7th Cir. 1992) (statingJudge Posner's position that, if result of strict
interpretation is absurd, judge is compelled to depart from that interpretation in direction of
sense); Hsam Inc. v. Gatter, 814 S.W.2d 887, 891 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Blackstone
and stating that if law as interpreted would bring about absurd result, courts "must deviate from
its perceived interpretation") (emphasis added).
94. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 509, 527-29 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (using principle to resolve problems posed by literal reading of FED. R. EVID.
609(a) (1)); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-61 (1892) (justifying
judicial interpretation of legislative intent via absurd result principle); United States v. Kirby, 74
U.S. 482, 486-87 (1868) (using principle to resolve problem posed by statute that, if applied
literally, would punish sheriff for arresting man indicted for murder merely because man was
carrying mail at time); United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating
principle in support of court's looking to purpose or intent of act when language would lead
to results "devastatingly and arbitrarily fortuitous").
95. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81 (discussing definition of absurdity as illogic in
sense of flaw in deduction reasoning).
96. See supra Part II.B.l.a (discussing definition of absurdity as illogic in sense of internal
contradiction).
97. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
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above that led to this last notion of absurdity.9 The naming of a
particular outcome as absurd does not arise from an initial attempt to
determine the meaning of a statute. Rather, it springs almost as a
reflex from the facts of the case after an initial determination of
probable meaning has been made. The sense that something was
wrong with punishing the surgeon for aiding a person in physical
distress no doubt led to the long debate about whether the law was to
be enforced against him, and not vice versa.100 It was not initially
a search for the intent of the lawmakers that led the Court in Kirby to
bridle at the prospect of punishing the sheriff for arresting a
suspected murderer merely because the suspect happened to be
carrying the mail at the time.10 It was rather the rejection, for
some reason, of that outcome that led the court to assert that it could
not have been intended.10 2
What inspired that initial rejection? As suggested by the discussion
above, it could not have been the constraints of formal logic. It
seems that the justification lay rather in the second type of meaning
indicated by the dictionary definitions.
2. Absurdity as irrationality, unreasonableness or an affront to common
sense
The set of dictionary definitions of absurd that relates to common
sense or reasonableness, rather than formal logic,"0 ' seems to apply
to the classic illustrations of the absurd result principle. It would be
absurd in terms of formal logic, at least according to a literal reading
of the law, if the man who "drew blood in the street" were not
"punished with the utmost severity." Yet the penalizing of the
surgeon who opened the vein of the person who had fallen down in
99. See supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
102. SeeUnited States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482,486-87 (1868) (first rejecting literal interprctation
of statute because of outcome it would require in this case, then stating that it will "be presumed
that the legislature intended exceptions" when literal application of statutory language would
lead to absurd results). Just as the logical problems are tidied up (after curing the absurd
outcome) by reconstruing the rule (to If p" then q), the problem of a perceived threat to
legislative supremacy is often disposed of by a statement that there is no evidence that the
court's result conflicts with the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Ambassador Div. of Florsheim
Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that "supposed absurdity"
arises not from congressional shortcomings but from overbreadth thatjudiciary can correct with
reference to intent); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that it is "entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including
... legislative history ... to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition ... was
indeed unthought of").
103. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
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the street in a fit is taken by all those citing the case to be a classic
example of absurdity.
10 4
This absurdity is seemingly of the same genre as another classic
example. Take the law stipulating that a person breaking out of
prison is guilty of a felony. That law was held not to extend to the
person who broke out because there was a fire in the prison, "'for he
is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt."" 5
Again, under a literal reading of the statute, formal logic would
require punishment in this situation, and reconstruing the legal rule
merely in order to avoid a particular outcome is generally considered
illegitimate. °6 Yet the application of the penalty in this situation is
called absurd, and this interpretation rejecting plain meaning is
traditionally regarded as entirely legitimate. 107
Why? The initial outcome offends us at some gut level; it offends
our sense not only of fairness, but of rationality and common sense.
And it offends, not simply, but radically. Our reaction goes beyond,
"That's not fair." It is more like "That's ridiculous; it makes no sense
at all; it's totally illogical." 10 8
In both these examples, the absurdity was resolved by withholding
enforcement of the rule in the particular situation. 9 In effect, the
rule of law is held inapplicable in situations where absurdity would
result. The judicial approach in these two examples is not to
reconstrue the facts." 0 Instead, the focus is on the rule itself, the
104. See Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487 (suggesting that penalizing surgeon goes against "common
sense"); see also cases collected in supra note 51.
105. See id. (quoting Plowden's reference to statute of 1st Edward II); supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
107. See Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487 (characterizing ruling as condoned by common sense).
108. This notion of absurdity corresponds roughly with that listed as an "evaluative"
argument by Zenon Bankowski and D. Neil MacCormick in their work Statutory Interpretation in
the United Kingdom, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 8, at 359, 370-
73. They distinguish this use of absurdity from a "linguistic" argument, id. at 364-66, further
explaining-
[Alpart from strict logical absurdity (self contradiction), courts sometimes reject
proposed interpretations of Acts as 'absurd,' even when on the face of it the proposed
interpretation seems to satisfy the 'plain meaning' test. This is no more than a strong
way of expressing a negative evaluation of the Act so interpreted; the significance of
the strength of the negative is that it justifies departure from the normal priority in
favor of a more obvious over a less obvious meaning.
Id. at 373. The "linguistic" absurdity argument corresponds with the first variety of formal logic
absurdity previously discussed. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
109. See Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487 (ruling thatAct punishing obstruction of mail or its carrier does
not apply when mail carrier is arrested following indictment for murder); 1 BLACESTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 30, at *60.
110. Recall that this was one of the possible approaches to resolving the logical problem
facing the judge who did not want to find guilty the man who was caught speeding. See supra
Part II.B.l.b (setting out example of man caught speeding).
1994]
152 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:127
judge apparently concluding that, in the particular factual circum-
stances, the rule cannot mean what it appears to mean."' That is,
its plain meaning cannot be its actual meaning.
n2
The declaration by ajudge that a statute's plain meaning cannot be
its actual meaning is itself subject to two interpretations. The word
"cannot" may be understood either descriptively or prescriptively. In
refusing to apply the rule as written, the judge may be stating that the
rule in fact does not mean what it appears to mean.113 Alternatively,
the judge may be stating that, regardless of any argument about actual
meaning, a statute will not be allowed to have a meaning resulting in
an absurdity."4 This latter understanding of what the court means
by implying that the plain meaning cannot be the actual meaning
supports the view that intent does not provide the justification for the
absurd result principle." 5 The question of just what the justification
is remains for the moment unanswered. The foregoing discussion
demonstrates, however, that the universally agreed upon archetypes
reflect a definition of absurdity related primarily to rationality,
reasonableness and common sense, rather than formal logic. This
111. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989) (stating that FED. R.
EVID. 609(a) (1) "'can't mean what it says'") (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700,703 (7th
Cir. 1987)); Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487. As outlined previously, there must be an implicit rewriting of
the rule in order to avoid creating a logical problem in the course of resolving the outcome
absurdity. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. The court, in effect, reads into the statute
an unwritten exception that makes the rule inapplicable to the situation before it. See id.
The exception usually is not explained by the court, however, and, in fact, often would not
be capable of being spelled out by the legislature either, at least not without creating an
immensely cumbersome statute. Rather, the absurd result principle is a general limitation, an
invisible exception clause in all statutes, necessarily having to be explicated in each individual
case. See Kirby, 74 U.S. at 485-87 (stating that there is always presumption that "legislature
intended exceptions" that would avoid absurd results).
112. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 510 (stating that Court cannot accept plain meaning
interpretation of FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1)); Kirby, 74 U.S. at 487 (asserting that in exceptional
cases, "[t]he reason of the law ... should prevail over its letter").
113. If intent is taken as the primary referent of interpretation, this case might be described
as one in which the words do not accurately reflect the legislature's intent. SeeAmbassador Div.
of Florsheim Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (implying that "true
intent of Congress" can be different from its "literally stated intent").
114. This dual possibility is mirrored in the language often used by courts to justify in terms
of legislative intent their construal around plain meaning. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 585
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that result in case was not one that "Congress conceivably
could have intended"). Ajudge will often attach to his or her declaration about what the statute
cannot mean some gesture toward the legislature, such as "for it cannot have been intended by
the legislature that" or "it will not be presumed that Congress." See id. Again, this language may
be read as reflecting a view that Congress is made up of rational people who could not intend
an absurdity. On the other hand, it may be read as a declaration that Congress will not be
permitted to legislate absurdity, or at least, not with any effect, for any such meaning will be
rejected by the Court. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 11-23 and 98 and accompanying text. This Article refers here to intent
as usually understood in the United States legal system-the actual intent of actual legisla-
tors-and not to a constructive notion of intent. Further, it does not here refer to a broadened
notion of intent that would include the purpose behind the legislation.
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gives some indication of the likely authority for the absurd result
principle. This point will be revisited in Part III. First, however, the
definition will be tested in light of a recent Supreme Court case.
C. An Application of the Proposed Definition:
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.," 6 the Supreme Court dealt
with a legal standard that all nine Justices regarded as being unwork-
able as written, and as meaning something other than what its plain
language said."7 Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)" 8 deals with
the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions for the purpose of
impeaching a witness."' At the time, the rule provided for the
116. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
117. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (stating that Rule
609(a) (1) "'can't mean what it says'") (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir.
1987)).
118. FED. R. EvID. 609(a) (1988) (appearing as promulgated in 1987, see28 U.S.C. app. 759
(1988), but amended in 1990 as reflected in 28 U.S.C. app. 539 (Supp. 111990)).
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) then provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established
by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Id.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are statutory. Prior to legislative development of the rules in
1973, however, the Supreme Court had transmitted its own proposed rules to Congress. RULES
OF EVIDENCE, COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEFJUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
46, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter RULES OF EVIDENCE]. Congress responded by
enacting a statute the result of which was that the rules were to be legislatively, rather than
judicially, formulated. See Federal Courts, Proposed Rules of Evidence, Congressional Approval
Requirement, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973) (suspending Rules of Evidence for U.S. courts
and magistrates and requiring congressional approval of Rules, Amendments to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ordered by
Supreme Court on Nov. 20, 1972 and Dec. 18, 1972); see alsoJAMES W. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1994 Rules Pamphlet Pt. 2, at 6-7 (1993). Although the rules passed by
Congress were based in substantial part on the draft as approved by the Supreme Court,
Congress did not enact the Court's version of Rule 609(a). See RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra. The
Court's proposed rule did not provide for a balancing of prejudice, and it was this provision in
Congress' version of the rule that was at issue in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
Both because the federal rules are obviously important to the judicial branch, and because
the Court had submitted its own formulation of the rules prior to Congress' decision to
reformulate them, it is possible that the Court was inclined to take a more aggressively critical
stance in this case than it might with respect to a different subject matter. See generally Bock
Laundry, 490 U.S. at 514-24 (documenting legislative history of Rule 609). It might therefore
be argued that this is a special case, and not one that illustrates a typical approach to statutory
interpretation. It is much more likely, however, that the background of the rules would make
the Court particularly conscious of separation of powers issues when deciding interpretive
questions regarding the rules, and that therefore this case is one in which the Court's approach
to statutory construction is shown in particularly sharp relief.
119. FED. R. EID. 609(a).
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mandatory admission of such evidence in two situations: one leg of
the rule involved so-called "crimenfalsi" evidence (evidence of crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement), and was not at issue in Bock
Laundry 120 the other leg of the rule involved crimes punishable
either by death or by more than a year's imprisonment, and required
the judge to apply a balancing test.121
It was the wording of the phrase calling for the balancing test that
was central to Bock Laundry.'22 That phrase directed that the
evidence was to be admitted if "the court determines that the
probative value of admitting [it] outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant."'23  The question presented was whether the rule
applied to civil trials, and, if so, whether it provided for a balancing
of prejudice to the civil defendant, but provided no such benefit to
the plaintiff.
124
As written, the rule did not specify whether it applied to civil trials,
criminal trials, or both." The court of appeals followed Third
Circuit precedent, which had interpreted the rule to apply in both
civil and criminal trials, and to allow the court to balance prejudice
only for defendants. 121 So interpreted, the rule left a judge no
discretion to balance prejudice to a civil plaintiff, but rather mandat-
ed the admission of a plaintiffs felony convictions on the issue of
credibility.2 7  Third Circuit precedent had criticized such a result,
120. See id. 609(a)(2); Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 505 (stating that case concerned Rule
609(a) (1)).
121. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. FED. R. EID. 609(a) (1); see Bock Laundy, 490 U.S. at 505-11 (documenting lower court
struggles with wording of Rule 609(a) (1)). Paul Green, the petitioner in Bock Laundy, had
obtained work-release employment at a car wash while in custody at a county prison. At work,
Green reached inside a large dryer and had his arm torn off by a large rotating drum. He
brought a civil products liability suit against Bock Laundry Machine Co., the manufacturer of
the machine. At trial, Green testified that he had been inadequately instructed about the
dangerous character of the machine. Bock Laundry impeached Green's testimony with evidence
that he had been convicted of two felonies, conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary. The
jury found in favor of the defendant, Bock Laundry, and Green appealed, arguing that the
impeaching evidence should have been excluded. The Third Circuit affirmed the Disrict
Court's ruling allowing the impeachment.
123. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
124. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 505 (questioning whether Rule 609(a)(1) may be
interpreted to benefit civil litigants). The rule has since been amended. While it still contains
a balancing test, it now provides a different test for witnesses generally than for an "accused" as
a witness. FED. R. EID. 609(a) (amended 1990). The word "defendant" has been dropped
from the rule. Id.
125. See FED. R EvID. 609(a) (1988); see also Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 508-09 (discussing
ambiguity of rule).
126. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 506-07 (referring to Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580-91 (3d
Cir. 1984), which cited precedent applying Rule 609(a) to both civil and criminal trials).
127. See id. (summarizing court of appeals' ruling that Rule 609 "forecloses judicial exercise
of... discretion" to exclude evidence of plaintiffs prior felony convictions); see also FED. R.
EVID. 609(a) (1) (requiring judge to balance prejudice only to defendant, and containing no
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calling it potentially "unjust and even bizarre," ' and "ridicu-
lous.' 129
The Supreme Court agreed with these criticisms. 3 Justice
Stevens' majority opinion stated that the rule's plain language
"9compel[s] an odd result in a case like this." 1' A plain reading of
the rule would result in the mandatory admission of impeachment
evidence detrimental to a civil plaintiff, while providing a civil
defendant the benefit of a balancing test."3 2 The Court stated that
it "cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the
same right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil
defendant."'3  It called such a result "unfathomable,"'34 conclud-
ing that, as far as civil trials were concerned, Rule 609(a) (1) "'can't
mean what it says.""13 5  The Court went on to examine the back-
ground and legislative history of the rule,"36 and concluded that the
balancing test of Rule 609(a) (1) was only intended to protect from
unfair prejudice the defendant in a criminal trial.' Thus the
Court held that Rule 609(a) (1) required a judge "to permit the
impeachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior felony convic-
tions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness or the party
offering the testimony,"38 and affirmed the appellate ruling. 39
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion took a different approach to the
same outcome. He criticized the majority for its lengthy exploration
of legislative history to determine the correct interpretation of the
language limiting its application to criminal cases).
128. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 507 (quoting Diggs, 741 F.2d at 582). The Third Circuit
decided Bock Laundry based on Diggs and without a published opinion.
129. Id. (quoting Diggs, 741 F.2d at 583) (Gibbons, J., dissenting)).
130. See id. at 509-10.
131. Id. at 509.
132. Id. at 510.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 511 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)). In addition
to its own reactions to Rule 609(a) as written, the majority opinion noted a number of reactions
from lower courts and commentators. See Diggs, 741 F.2d at 582 (calling results of plain
meaning interpretation of Rule "unjust and even bizarre"), quoted in Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at
507; Diggs, 741 F.2d at 583 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (asserting that result "makes no sense
whatever"), quoted in Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 508; 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
316, at 324-25 n.26 (1979) (noting inconsistency arising from allowing exclusion of evidence of
convictions of civil defendants), quoted in Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 511 n.9; 10 JAMES W. MOORE
ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 609.14[4], at VI-148 (1966) (stating that "subsection (a) (1)
is deficient, in that it cannot be sensibly applied in civil cases"), quoted in Bock Laundry, 490 U.S.
at 511 n.9.
136. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 511-24.
137. Id. at 523-24.
138. Id. at 527.
139. Id
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rule. 14' He explicitly called the results of 609 (a)'s plain meaning
"absurd."14 He described the outcome of a literal reading, whereby
"civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs receive the benefit of weighing
prejudice," as "unthinkable" and "bizarre," 42 contending that the
rule "cannot have been meant literally."43 Justice Scalia continued,
asserting that the word defendant in the rule "cannot rationally...
mean to provide the benefit of prejudice-weighing to civil defendants
and not civil plaintiffs." 144
The fact that all nine Justices concluded that Rule 609 (a) was
unreasonable or absurd as written 145 makes this an interesting
example to consider in light of the previously proposed definitions of
absurdity.'46 It gives some sense of what kind of absurdity was
thought by these and many lower court judges not only to justify, but
in fact to require, an exception to plain meaning.
The first proposed definition of the term absurd was "illogical" or
"logically contradictory."147 Rule 609(a) can be examined in order
to determine whether it is illogical or logically contradictory. The first
prong of 609 (a) can be stated in the following simplified form:
140. Id at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. Id. (stating that literal interpretation produced absurd result and adding that result may
be unconstitutional as well).
142. Id. at 527.
143. Id. at 528.
144. Id. Justice Scalia's solution, though, does not require looking into the legislative history
for the actual meaning of the rule. He criticized the majority for doing just that, id. at 527-28,
arguing that while it is appropriate to look at all public materials, including legislative history,
to verify that Congress did not intend the interpretation that resulted in absurdity, these
materials should not be used to attempt to determine what Congress did in fact mean, id.
Instead, to determine the rule's meaning, Justice Scalia considers the "available alternative"
interpretations, and chooses the one that (in his opinion) "[q]uite obviously.., does least
violence to the text." Id. at 529. Justice Scalia explained:
The available alternatives are to interpret "defendant" to mean (a) "civil plaintiff, civil
defendant, prosecutor, and criminal defendant," (b) "civil plaintiff and defendant and
criminal defendant," or (c) "criminal defendant." Quite obviously, the last does least
violence to the text. It adds a qualfication that the word "defendant" does not contain but,
unlike the others, does not give the word a meaning ("plaintiff" or "prosecutor") it simply will
not bear. The qualification it adds, moreover, is one that could understandably have
been omitted by inadvertence-and sometimes is omitted in normal conversation ("I
believe strongly in defendants' rights"). Finally, this last interpretation is consistent with
the policy of the law in general and the Rules of Evidence in particular of providing special
protection to defendants in criminal cases.
Id. (emphasis added).
145. See id. at 530 (Blackmun,J., dissenting,joined by Brennan,J., and Marshall,J.) (stating
that although they disagree with result, they agree with majority that rule cannot mean what it
says on its face).
146. See supra Part ILB (discussing various definitions of "absurd").
147. See supra Part II.B.1.
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If:
a witness' prior conviction was punishable at the time of
conviction by death or more than one year of imprisonment
And
the court determines that the probative value of admitting the
evidence of prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the defendant,
Then:
the evidence of prior conviction shall be admitted under the
circumstances and for the purpose provided.14
There is nothing illogical about this rule in the sense of internal
contradiction, 149 nor is there anything that would make logical
application of this rule impossible. To apply the rule, a court merely
checks the potential punishment for the prior conviction and weighs
the probative value of the evidence of prior conviction against its
prejudicial effect to the defendant.' 0 If the evidence passes both
parts of this test, the judge is to admit it.
It seems, then, that the rule was workable as written. There was,
however, something there that bothered the Justices enough to
inspire all of them, even a textualist like Justice Scalia, to reject the
plain meaning of the statute and do some reworking of the words that
Congress passed into law.' Although different members of the
Court took different tacks, there was unanimity on this point.
Whatever it was about Rule 609 (a) that bothered the Justices, it was
not absurdity in the sense of formal logic. It seems rather to fall into
the second category that defines absurdity as "ridiculously inconsistent
with reason or the plain dictates of common sense,"'52 or "very
unsuitable... ridiculous, foolish."'53 The comments about the rule
made by the various opinions seem to confirm this definition' of
148. See FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1) (providing general rule for attacking credibility of
witnesses).
149. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d
1339, 1345 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that amendment to ERISA did not violate substantive due
process). In Lady Baltimore Foods, Judge Posner described Rule 609(a) (1) as "a perfectly
straightforward, flawlessly grammatical, syntactically impeccable prose specimen." Id.
150. See FED. t- EvID. 609(a)(1). Though the majority opinion in Bock Laundry raises the
problem of unexpected designations of parties in a case, see Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 510 n.7
(arguing that declaratoryjudgment and interpleader actions may invert expected designations
of plaintiff and defendant), it would not seem to be an insurmountable task for any court to
work out the appropriate designation of each of the parties with respect to each of the claims
at issue.
151. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 527 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (stating that task before Court
was to give some alternative meaning to statute in order to avoid absurd result).
152. WEBSTER's NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIGrIONARY, supra note 61, at 8; see also supra
notes 60-63 and accompanying texL
153. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 62, at 5; see also supra notes 60-63 and
accompanying text.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW
absurd, at least in this instance.1 14 As noted,'55 the opinions refer
to the result of a literal interpretation of Rule 609(a) as "ridiculous,"
"unfathomable," and "bizarre," and as "mak[ing] no sense whatev-
er."1 56  These are a very close match with those dictionary defini-
tions of absurdity.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Several points can now be made about the implications of the
absurd result principle for theories of statutory interpretation. As
suggested above, the principle poses some problems for textualism.
Even more importantly, however, the principle seems to be a
particular instance of interpretation as the balancing of fundamental
values in order to maintain coherence in the legal system as a whole.
A. Some Points About Textualism
1. The primacy of text
The absurd result principlejustifies departures from interpretations
based on the text of the statute. 57 The fact that even a strict
textualist like Justice Scalia has endorsed this principle, allowing
exceptions from plain meaning (albeit in limited circumstances) , 5'
suggests something not only about the uniqueness of this principle
among doctrines of statutory interpretation, but also about literalist
theories of interpretation.
What the principle suggests about textualism is that even while
textualism purports to hold the text as the primary, if not sole, source
of a statute's meaning,"9 it acknowledges something as primary even
to text, that is, non-absurdity or, using the definitions proposed here,
154. See supra Part II.B.2 (defining absurdity as irrationality, unreasonableness, or affront to
common sense).
155. See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
157. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d
1339, 1345 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that general rule is if literal reading would produce absurd
results, then interpreter is free to depart in direction of sense).
158. See Bock Laundy, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that, when literal
interpretation would lead to absurd result, court's task is to give statute different meaning that
will avoid absurd consequences).
159. See generally Textualis, supra note 14. Though even Justice Scalia would look beyond
the words of the applicable statutory section to ascertain statutory meaning, the other sources
he would consult are all textual ones, i.e., the language of other sections of the same statute and
the language of analogous statutes. William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique ofJustice Scalia's
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1140 (1992) (stating thatJustice Scalia
relies on three textual sources of interpretation: ordinary meaning of words at issue,
consideration of other words in same statute, and consideration of words of other statutes).
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rationality or common sense."' Textualists might attempt to place
this trump to text in a small comer of their system, and claim that it
does not challenge the primacy of text because it comes into play only
rarely. The absurd result principle, however, belies this attempt. The
principle appears to be a pervasive and encompassing restriction on
text, even if it rarely alters the outcome that would obtain in its
absence. Furthermore, although non-absurdity and text may clash
only rarely, every time they do, text must bow to non-absurdity.x6'
Every initial interpretation of a statute is subject to an implicit, and
controlling, review to assure that it would not result in absurdity. 62
The preeminence of non-absurdity over text would seem to pose no
problem for traditional approaches to statutory interpretation that
regard text as merely the best initial indicator of intent or purpose,
the effecting of which is regarded as the primary goal of interpreta-
tion. 6 The implications for textualism, however, are considerable.
The primacy of the non-absurdity principle implies that, in the realm
of statutory interpretation, text is not king, despite sometimes
absolutist contentions to the contrary.'6
2. The empirical critique of the legal process theory
Another instance of the absurd result principle's having implica-
tions for textualism concerns the theoretical roots of the so-called
"new textualism."165 Although the plain meaning rule has a lengthy
history in statutory interpretation, 66 this modem form of literalism
arose partially in reaction to the apparent failure of traditional legal
process theory to recognize and take account of the empirical realities
160. See supra Part II.B.2 (defining absurdity as irrationality or affront to common sense).
161. See Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d at 1345 (asserting that if literal reading would produce
absurd result then interpreter is compelled to depart in direction of sense).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102; see also supra note 111.
163. See Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1966) (indicating that, while
words are the most persuasive evidence of statute's purpose, and plain meaning is ordinarily to
be followed, at times court should not follow plain meaning if it conflicts with reasonableness
or congressional intent) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940)); see also Textualism, supra note 14, at 626 (noting that traditional approach to statutory
interpretation is for court to implement "original intent or purpose of enacting Congress");
supra note 71 and sources cited therein.
164. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislature History: A Critique, 66 IND.
L J. 699, 699 (1991) (commenting that "constitutional primacy of text is doubtful, given the
well-known exception that plain meaning will not be implemented if it produces an 'absurd'
result").
165. See generally Textualism, supra note 14, at 640-44 (explaining that new textualism arose
in part as result of realist and historicist critiques of traditional approach to statutory
interpretation).
166. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1980) (stating that when plain language of
statute is clear, there is no need to look beyond words of statute); THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra
note 71, at 1145 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 468, 485-86 (1917)).
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of the legislative process. 167 Legal process theory is said to be based
on an assumption that the legislature is made up of reasonable people
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."6  Legislators are pre-
sumed to engage in purposeful acts, and courts are to seek out the
rational legislative purpose when interpreting a statute.169
Modem public choice theory challenges this picture of the
legislative process. 171 Public choice theory views the legislature as
a market in which disparate interest groups demand various pieces of
legislation, and legislators supply legislation to meet these demands,
primarily in accordance with their self-interested goal of reelec-
tion.17 1 The market model is an economic one, and it recognizes
only certain kinds of motivations and incentives.17 1 In this model,
legislators are the familiar utility maximizers of economic theory.
Their purposes boil down to dealmaking, and although that may be
a rational purpose in the view of economists, it is certainly not the
kind of rational purpose that legal process theorists seem to have had
in mind.
A picture of the legislative process so different from that allegedly
posited by legal process theory has prompted many who subscribe to
that picture to reject the legal process approach to statutory interpre-
tation, in part as being founded on false premises.173 It has led new
textualists further to reject, or to treat merely as confirmatory, any
167. See Textualism, supra note 14, at 640-44 (discussing realist perspectives on legal process
approach to statutory interpretation); see also ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 17, at 571-72
(noting that law and economics scholars have criticized legal process approach as premised on
simplistic view of legislative process).
168. THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 71, at 1157 (stating that statutes should be presumed
to be reasonable and never interpreted as directing irrational pattern of particular application).
Though this might be taken as an empirical description, Hart and Sacks specifically referred to
it as a "benevolent presumption" later in those materials. See id. at 1178 (arguing that
examination of legislative intent, coupledwith "benevolent presumption" that legislature consists
of reasonable people with reasonable purposes, resolves many problems of statutory
interpretation).
169. See THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 71, at 1157 (arguing that first task in interpretation
of statute is to "determine what purpose ought to be attributed to it," in part by presuming
legislature pursues reasonable purposes).
170. See supra notes 66-69 (explaining that public choice theorists view legislative process as
microeconomic system).
171. See supra notes 66-69 (discussing economic aspects of public choice theory, which argues
that political choices are made primarily by individuals pursuing their own self-interests). But
seeFarber & Frickey, supra note 66, at 875 (pointing out that later public choice scholarship has
developed richer, less simplistic models).
172. See supra note 66 (stating that public choice scholars view legislative process as
marketplace, and statutes as merely deals resulting from market's operation).
173. See supra notes 66-69 (discussing public choice scholars' economic view of legislative
process as opposed to reasonable legislature view of legal process theorists).
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source of statutory interpretation other than the words enacted into
law.174
The legal process presumption of a reasonable legislature looks
different when considered in light of the above discussion of the
absurd result principle. If the absurd result principle presumes a
legislature that closely resembles the one that legal process theorists
presumed, 175 and if textualists subscribe to that principle, then they
may be required to reconsider their rejection on this ground of the
legal process approach to statutory interpretation. More particularly,
if the absurd result principle's 'reasonable legislature' is merely a
presumption, and if it is one to which textualists subscribe through
the absurd result principle, then an approach to statutory interpreta-
tion allegedly built on such a presumption cannot logically be rejected
by textualists on empirical grounds.
On the other hand, if the absurd result principle does not involve
merely a "benign fiction " 176 of a presumption about legislative
intent, but rather purports to be based on actual intent, a problem of
another sort is posed for textualists. For textualism is based in part
on a claim that intent is an incoherent concept, impossible to
ascertain. 7 7 And yet, again, textualists do endorse the absurd result
principle.7
The absurd result principle seems, then, to pose at least two
problems for textualism. On the one hand, textualists face criticism
for being inconsistent if they reject the concept of intent while
endorsing an absurd result principle based on actual intent. On the
174. Textualist rejection of other sources rests on things other than the perceived flaw in the
legal process view of the legislative process. Concerns about constitutional requirements and
criticism of other sources of interpretation (such as some forms of legislative history) are also
behind the textualist position. See generally Textualism, supra note 14, at 640-44 (explaining that
new textualists have rejected context-based approach of traditionalists).
175. SeeTHE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 71, at 1157 (stating that interpreters should presume
that legislature is comprised of reasonable people acting reasonably for rational and legitimate
purposes); see also Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence
15 CARDOZO L. REv. 601, 664 (1993) (arguing that workable theory of statutory interpretation
can only be formulated by developing coherent and reasoned pattern of applications intelligibly
related to general purpose of statute).
176. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(referring not to absurd result principle but to analogous assumption that Congress always
intends compatibility between any particular provision of law and surrounding body of law into
which provision must be integrated). The phrase that Justice Scalia uses in endorsing such
assumptions is similar to that used by Hart and Sacks to describe the presumption of a
reasonable legislature. See THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 71, at 1178 (stating "benevolent
presumption" that legislature is made up of reasonable people pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably).
177. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 6 and 158 and accompanying text (noting that textualists explicitly
accept validity of absurd result principle).
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other hand, if the principle as sanctioned by textualists is based on a
constructive or objective notion of intent,179 then they are employ-
ing a "benign fiction" similar to what legal process theorists pro-
posed."' If this is the case, it is considerably more difficult for
textualists to criticize legal process theory as being based on a
misconception of the legislative process.
B. Predictability: The Reliance Interest
The plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation is some-
times explained in terms of the need for the law to be accessible to
the common person, and not just to those trained in the law.'
This reasoning can also be taken to support the absurdity exception
to plain meaning. It might be argued that the absurd result principle
undermines reliance by the lay reader wishing to conform his or her
conduct to the law and plan his or her affairs in accordance with
it. 8  Such a layperson would likely look to the plain language of
the statute for the rule of law, and be misled if the rule were different
from the plain meaning. The premise of this argument, however, is
that the lay reader is not aware of the unwritten exceptions familiar
to lawyers and judges and is somehow misled by such exceptions.
Is this likely in the case of the absurdity principle? Or is it more
likely that this exception to plain meaning is not in fact primarily a
principle of the legal profession, but rather one of the lay reader, the
so-called "reasonable person"? A lay reader may look at the words of
a statute and automatically question, rather than accept, an under-
standing of the words that would result in absurdity. That person,
after reading the statute, may perceive a possible meaning that would
lead to an absurd result, and immediately say to himself, "That makes
no sense at all-it can't mean that." This is precisely the reaction
previously described in the discussion regarding the "common sense"
notion of absurdity.
183
Perhaps the category of absurdity in this instance is not one whose
precise requirements in particular cases would be unanimously agreed
179. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
180. See THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 71, at 1157, 1178 (explaining presumption of
reasonable legislature).
181. See Farber, supra note 28, at 543 (noting revival of formalist approaches, which
recommend heavier reliance on plain meaning in statutory interpretation, in part because it
provides better notice to public of law's meaning).
182. See Scalia, supra note 26, at 1179 (arguing that common understanding of statute is
plain language interpretation); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11 (discussing how judicial use of absurd result
principle involves notions of rationality and common sense).
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upon, either among members of the legal community, or among
people generally. However, absurdity, being apparently more a
common sense concept than a legal one, is arguably no more within
the special knowledge and training of the legal community than it is
within the common knowledge and instinct of the community at
large.18
4
A second possible critique is that the absurdity principle operates
to eliminate a most likely meaning of a statute without directing the
reader to a particular alternative meaning. 85 Theoretically, this lack
of direction could reduce certainty for the lay reader, thereby
undermining reliance.
But how would eliminating the absurdity principle affect reliance?
Principally, any hoped for increase in the layperson's ability to read
a statute and order her conduct in accordance with it would be more
than offset by the uncertainty that would result from knowing that the
law can mean something that does not make sense, and further, that
it can be enforced against people in ways that cannot be anticipated
by a rational reading of the law's words. The absurdity principle
leaves a narrower margin of uncertainty in the layperson's reading of
the statute than the margin resulting from the alternative principle
that the laws, as written, are not necessarily consistent with the laws
of reason, rationality, and common sense.1
86
C. Legislative Supremacy and Rule of Law Values
The absurd result principle has been perceived as posing a
challenge to legislative supremacy.187  Some would argue that any
judicial inquiry into intent that looks beyond the plain language of a
184. It is true that we reserve to judges the authority to make the final decision about what
will be held absurd, but this is no more to say that it is a matter of special judicial ability than
it would be to assert that when a judge, rather than a jury, acts as the factfinder in a trial, her
final judgment regarding questions of fact is a matter of special judicial ability. Rather, the
presence or absence of a jury is a function of constitutional requirements, see U.S. CONST.
amend. VI, not of the relative expertise of laypersons andjudges. More precisely, the absence
of ajury in any particular case does not make the judge's factfinding in such cases a matter of
special judicial expertise.
185. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-29 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that when literal reading of statute would produce absurd result, some
alternative meaning must be given, and discussing several alternatives available).
186. This is not to suggest that the principle's effect on public confidence is a function of
the number of cases in which it makes a difference in outcome. Those are admittedly rare.
Rather, the above assertions rest on the assumption that the principle's importance lies precisely
in the fact that it is in effect at all times and in all cases, an overarching condition of statutory
law. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61 (arguing that absurd result principle is pervasive
and always primary to text).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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statute is a threat to legislative supremacy.' Yet, even those
endorsing the use of extra-textual materials to ascertain legislative
intent might have difficulty with an absurd result principle that was
based not on actual intent, but on a prescriptive or objective notion
of intent. 9 If the judicial reference to legislative intent in the
application of the absurd result principle does not involve an actual
inquiry but rather a construct, is not judicial power extended at the
expense of legislative supremacy?
The discussion in this Article of the possible meanings of absurdity
suggests that a set of values other than legislative supremacy is
implicated by the absurd result principle and, in fact, justifies it. It is
perhaps that set of underlying values, and not the absurd result
principle itself, that is in tension with legislative supremacy. In
summarizing a comprehensive comparative work on statutory
interpretation undertaken by an international group of scholars, D.
Neil MacCormick and Robert S. Summers argue that interpretive
arguments draw their justificatory force from "pervasive underlying
values of great importance to contemporary legal systems."9'
Among the underlying values they discuss are democratic principles,
including legislative supremacy, and rule of law principles. 9' They
note that the rule of law, among other things, sets "conditions for the
proper exercise of legislative power."92
I have argued that the absurd result principle acts prescriptively and
sets boundaries or conditions on legislative power.9 I have also
argued that the principle fosters the rule of law in at least one way, by
serving the reliance interest.'94 My discussion of possible definitions
noted that the principle most commonly is not one of formal logic,
but rather one of rationality, reasonableness, and common sense.
The application of these general values in particular situations
188. See Textualism, supra note 14, at 648 (describing position of some critics who argue that
judicial inquiry beyond actual words of statute poses risk ofjudicial usurpation of legislature
role).
189. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (explaining that principle was designed to
strike balance where courts did not have to adhere to strict literal interpretations but could not
depart in random directions).
190. See MacCormick & Summers, supra note 14, at 512; see also id. at 532 (stating that
ultimate level of justification of interpretive arguments and their directives comes from
underlying values).
191. See MacCormick & Summers, supra note 14, at 534-35 (asserting that democracy,
separation of powers, and rule of law constitute underpinning values for statutory interpreta-
tion).
192. MacCormick & Summers, supra note 14, at 535 (enumerating conditions set by rule of
law, such as banning or restricting retroactive laws).
193. See supra Part IIIA.1.
194. See supra Part III.B.
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requires a further reference to a variety of underlying values that are
deeply embedded in our legal system and in our culture.9 5 I have
described the archetypal illustrations of the absurd result principle as
involving situations that just seemed "wrong. "196 Our sense of
wrong, which leads to the almost universal rejection of these situations
as absurd, is rooted in some underlying values that are violated by
those situations.
This understanding sheds light on two perennial difficulties
concerning the absurd result principle.197 First, the difficulty of
defining absurdity, and the historical lack of attempts to do so, can
now be explained in part by the fact that the principle represents a
collection of values that are fundamental to our legal system, yet
seldom made explicit in the course of the principle's application.
Second, the perceived tension between the absurd result principle
and the principle of legislative supremacy can now be understood not
as conflict, but rather as complimentarily, essential to our legal
system. The tension between the two principles should not be taken
as a mark against either. Rather, the principles should be understood
as each representing an important set of values, legislative supremacy
representing democratic ideals, and the absurd result principle
representing rule of law values. Therefore, they should be maintained
in dynamic tension, as each essential to the legal system.
Although both sets of values are important, democratic values, as
represented by the principle of legislative supremacy, are sometimes
emphasized almost to the exclusion of rule of law values in discussions
of statutory interpretation. 198 For this reason, the absurd result
principle and the values it represents are important for the current
debate about the proper role of judges with respect to statutes.1 99
The growth of literalism may be inspired by a perceived need to
195. See, eg., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1988) (rejecting plain
language interpretation that would offend fundamental principles of special protection for
criminal defendants and equal treatment of civil litigants); ii at 529 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that chosen interpretation is "consistent with the policy of the law in general ... of
providing special protection for defendants in criminal cases"); see also supra Part I.C (discussing
how each member of Court viewed Rule 609(a) as unworkable as written).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 6-16 (discussing both lack of literature on principle
and criticisms that principle is threat to legislative supremacy).
198. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing efforts by various people to
resolve what they perceive as principle's threat to legislative supremacy).
199. See Bock Laundy, 490 U.S. at 508 (stating that purpose of Court is not to fashion statute
in way that Justices deem desirable, but rather to identify rule fashioned by Congress). See
generally Textuallsm, supra note 14, at 640-50 (outlining critiques of traditional approach to
statutory interpretation, including debate about proper role ofjudges in interpretation).
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restrain judicial activism. 200 But to the extent that literalism empha-
sizes democratic values and neglects rule of law values, it is detrimen-
tal both to the things that literalism is meant to protect and to the
legal system as a whole. Although literalism has been defended as
promoting rule of law values,21 it can undermine those values when
not tempered with the absurd result principle. °2
Some commentators assert that a system of interpretation must
ultimately balance various underlying values in order to maintain a
dynamic coherence within a legal system. 203  The absurd result
principle exemplifies an aspect of that necessary balancing. Disagree-
ment about its meaning and application in particular cases should
therefore be seen as a concrete example of the maintenance of
dynamic coherence in the system, and the principle itself seen as an
important key to developing any general theory of statutory interpre-
tation.
200. See Farber, supra note 28, at 542-43 (explaining position of those whose concerns about
judicial discretion have led them to increased emphasis on plain meaning of words of statute);
see also supra note 188 and accompanying text (noting concerns of those who feel that
interpretation not limited to words allows too much judicial discretion).
201. See generally, Scalia, supra note 26 (noting that predictability is essential to rule of law,
that rules promote predictability, and that plain meaning approach facilitates development of
clear rules).
202. Cf Farber, supra note 28, at 559 (noting that, though one goal of the legal system is to
make law understandable and predictable to citizens, formalist reliance on plain meaning could
undermine that purpose, because precise language "may be much less accessible [to ordinary
citizens] than an understanding of [the statute's] general purposes, as they relate to shared
social norms," and so reliance on plain meaning may "create traps" for citizens, rather than
making laws more accessible to them).
203. See MacCormick & Summers, supra note 14, at 538-39 (stating that interpretation will
only be satisfactory if it involves equilibrium between fundamental values).
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